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Abstract 
 
In 2008, the European Community (EC) adopted a Proposal to revise the EC Directive on 
nonhuman animal experiments, with the aim of improving the welfare of the nonhuman 
animals used in experiments.   An Impact Assessment, which gauges the likely economic, 
scientific and nonhuman animal welfare effects of future changes, informs the Proposal. 
By using a discourse analytical approach, this paper examines the Directive, the Impact 
Assessment and the Proposal to critically reflect upon assumptions about the morality of 
nonhuman animal experiments. Because nonhuman animal welfare is so prominent in 
the Proposal, it appears that the EC position advances beyond human self-interest 
(orthodox rational choice) as the sole motivator for such experiments, to ethical questions 
about the welfare of nonhuman animals (which can be better explained by a 
multidimensional approach to rational choice).   In examining this contention, this paper 
concludes that, even given concerns about nonhuman animal welfare, nonhuman animal 
experimentation in the EC is firmly grounded in a morality that focuses on human benefit 
goals rather than on the wider moral issues associated with the means of achieving such 
goals.   
 
Keywords: european community, nonhuman, animal, human, experiments, ethics, 
rational choice. 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In 2005 in the European Community (EC), over 12 million nonhuman animals were used in 
experiments (Commission of the European Communities, 2007).  Though the rules 
governing such experiments differ among Member States, discourses associated with 
their approval are often similar, being typically located within evaluations of the moral 
integrity (connected with the benefits that might accrue) of conducting them.  Taking one 
Member State as an example: the UK-based Coalition for Medical Research asserts that 
“…animal research has played a major part in developing improvements in human 
health”, but stresses that “The work we do is performed with compassion, care, humanity 
and humility” (2007, p.2).  This reflection on the welfare of nonhuman animals implies 
that stark utilitarian choices associated with maximising human benefits2 and minimising 
human costs of such experiments is tempered by a concern with the morality of imposing 
harms on those experimented upon; accordingly nonhuman experiments are only 
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justifiable, under these conditions, if nonhuman animal harms are surpassed by the 
benefits accrued.  This is prominent in the EC position on nonhuman animal experiments. 
 
The theme of nonhuman animal welfare is extant in a Proposal (adopted by the EC in 
November 2008), to revise the EC 1986 Directive 86/609/EEC, which had sought to place 
foundational requirements for nonhuman animal experiments on Member States 
(Council of the European Communities, 1986).  The Proposal, which aims to protect the 
internal market and to improve the welfare of nonhuman animals (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008b), is informed by an Impact Assessment that gauges the 
likely economic, scientific and nonhuman animal welfare effects of proposed changes to 
the Directive (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a).  By focusing on the 
Directive, the Assessment and the Proposal, this paper explores, via critical rational choice 
theory, the complex character of choice discourses connected with the EC position, in 
order to reflect upon assumptions central to the claims about the morality of nonhuman 
animal experiments.  Because nonhuman animal welfare is so prominent in the Proposal, 
it appears that the EC position has advanced beyond human self-interest to wider moral 
concerns about the welfare of nonhuman animals.   Rational choice theories enable 
exploration of this contention because such theories provide a basis for examining 
motivations for, and decisions about, nonhuman animal experiments, and critical 
discourse analysis facilitates some unveiling of the assumptions in which the EC position is 
rooted.  In accordance with this, my main aim is to examine the EC position on nonhuman 
animal experiments in terms of notions of moral progress by: (a) exploring one-
dimensional and multi-dimensional approaches to rational choice theory as explanations 
for the EC position; and (b) by investigating assumptions central to the EC logic on 
nonhuman animal experiments.  
 
The aims are reflected in the structure of this paper.  The opening section summarizes the 
EC position and explains why discourse analysis is an appropriate tool for undertaking an 
analysis of the complexity of the discourses associated with the changes proposed.  As the 
focus is on change, the next section explores orthodox rational choice notions of decision-
making that centre on the weighing up of human costs and human benefits as an 
explanation of nonhuman animal experimentation.  This orthodox approach to the 
‘rational’ focuses on self-interested actors (Zafirovski, 1999) but, because the theme of 
nonhuman animal welfare is extant in the EC Proposal, in the section that follows I move 
on to a more complex rational choice approach. Here I utilize the work of the economic 
sociologist, Zafirovski, who posits a multidimensional rational choice model where 
‘rational’ is defined in both utilitarian and non-utilitarian terms (1999, p. 47).    This is a 
more useful approach for the purpose here, because it allows consideration of the moral 
reasoning associated with the EC Proposal.  However, even given the nonhuman animal 
welfare concerns extant in the Proposal, I conclude that the Proposal is grounded in 
human benefit goals associated with the assumed primary moral importance of the 
human rather than, following Bauman  (2000), the wider moral issues associated with the 
means of achieving these goals.    
 
Examining discourses associated with experiments on nonhuman animals in the 
European Community  
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Annually more than 100 million nonhuman animals are used in experiments worldwide 
(Rowlands, 2002, p. 124), and in 2005 in the EC alone 12.2 million (vertebrate, living) 
nonhuman animals3 were used in experiments (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2007).  Because regulations on nonhuman animal experiments vary among 
Member States, the 1986 Directive sought to harmonise the regulations “regarding the 
protection” of nonhuman animals used in experiments in the EC (Council of the European 
Communities, 1986).  Only selected nonhuman animals are ‘protected’ (and ‘protection’ 
here refers to cover by the Directive rather than shielding from danger or injury), and 
protected nonhuman animals comprise “any live non-human vertebrate, including free-
living larval and/or reproducing larval forms, but excluding foetal or embryonic forms” 
(Council of the European Communities, 1986, Article 2a). Experiments consist of “any use 
of an animal for experimental or other scientific purposes which may cause it pain, 
suffering, distress or lasting harm” (Council of the European Communities 1986, Article 
2d).  Permitted purposes for experiments are associated with: the development, 
manufacture and testing of drugs, foodstuffs and other products; disease prevention, 
diagnosis or treatment; assessment, discovery, regulation or modification of physiological 
conditions in humans, nonhuman animals and plants; and the protection of the natural 
environment (Council of the European Communities 1986, Articles 3a and 3b).  In 
November 2008, the European Commission adopted a Proposal to revise this Directive, 
with the aims of protecting the internal market and improving the welfare of nonhuman 
animals (Commission of the European Communities, 2008b). The Impact Assessment, 
upon which this Proposal is based, gauges the likely economic, scientific and nonhuman 
animal welfare effects of proposed changes (Commission of the European Communities, 
2008).  The rest of the paper focuses on extracts from the Directive, the Impact 
Assessment and the Proposal.  
 
In order to explore the complexity of the discourses associated with the proposed EC 
changes, and to critically reflect upon the moral position extant in the Proposal, I apply a 
discourse analytical approach to the extracts. This approach is appropriate because 
discourse is fundamental to our construction of truth as, ‘effects of truth are produced 
within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 118).  
Accordingly, I consider how the discourses within the texts normalise the oppression of 
nonhuman animals, and explore how layers of ethical approval and moral progress mask 
this normalised oppression.  Consequently, my approach conforms to critical discourse 
analysis because I seek to ‘analyse how social and political inequalities are manifest in and 
reproduced through discourse’ (Wooffitt, 2005, p. 137).  In this regard, I explore the 
harms-benefits discourse associated with the regulatory choices made about nonhuman 
animal experiments in the EC, and critically reflect upon the assumption that the 
endorsement of experiments on nonhuman animals can be ethical.  However, I do not 
use an intense discourse analytical approach, which would provide a more detailed 
analysis of the language in the texts, rather I use discourse analysis as a tool for 
uncovering assumptions contained in the texts.  To do this, I ground my theoretical 
approach in critical rational choice theory because this facilitates reflection upon the 
complex character of choice discourses connected with the EC Proposal.    Consequently, I 
aim to explore constructions of, and assumptions about, human and nonhuman animal 
liberties (and associated moral positions on these) and investigate how the language in 
the texts constructs and reconstructs human choices about nonhuman animal 
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experiments.   As the permitted purposes of nonhuman animal experiments are 
principally located within evaluations of the maximisation of human progress, I now move 
on to consider motivations for nonhuman animal experiments by means of orthodox 
rational choice theory of instrumental human motivations. Thus, I interpret orthodox 
rational choice as relating to costs and benefits to the beneficiary (or the group of 
beneficiaries) making the choice (in this case humans). 
 
A one-dimensional utilitarian approach to nonhuman animal experimentation 
 
The social theorist Bauman (2000) finds repugnant a world structured around 
instrumental rational choice, however, he despondently declares that this is the actuality 
of our current times (Fine and Hirsh, 2000, p. 184).  For Bauman (2000), the immorality of 
the present age is that we spend most of our lives grappling with decisions about which 
goals to pursue rather than struggling with the moral issues associated with the means of 
achieving these goals.  So, for Fine and Hirsh (2000), Bauman’s conceptualisation 
conforms to an orthodox rational choice model because human action is defined simply in 
terms of the desire to maximise gains and minimise costs.   Our desire to maximise gains 
and minimise costs are evident at individual, corporate, and societal levels, and this points 
to a problem; orthodox rational choice theory usually centres on individual level choices 
because, as Craven points out, there is disagreement about whether collectivities can 
make “fully rational choices” (1992, p. 22).  Of course, many of our choices are not made 
by us at all, but are made on our behalf (e.g. by elected representatives in governments), 
and this, not least, demonstrates that attention only to the individual level conceals the 
role of higher-level decision-making processes (Beckford, 1999)4.  My focus is on collective 
decisions, and Zafirovski (1999) contends that (multidimensional) rational choice theory is 
an effective tool for revealing features of higher-level decision-making (in this case EC 
decisions about nonhuman animal experiments).     
 
Orthodox rational choice models provide a good starting point for exploring decisions 
about nonhuman animals experiments because orthodox models focus on, what Archer 
and Tritter (2000) call in another context, an ‘instrumentally rational’ costs-benefits 
approach, where the costs (in this case, what would be lost if nonhuman animal 
experiments did not take place) are evaluated in terms of the benefits (the benefits of 
nonhuman animal experiments). It is specifically this attachment to instrumentally 
rational action, argue Emel and Wolch (1998), that permits nonhuman animal 
experiments to take place at all.  So, as Garner comments, advocates of nonhuman 
animal experiments claim that “using animals in scientific procedures does, in a way that 
no alternative could, contribute to the longevity of human life” (2005, p. 131).  This 
position is not without its critics. For example, ‘practical anti-vivisectionists’ maintain that 
nonhuman animal experiments do not produce human gains (Garner 2005, p. 127)5.   
Nonetheless, the EC position is that nonhuman animal experiments yield essential 
benefits and the costs of prohibiting such experiments would be felt in such areas as 
disease diagnosis, treatment and prevention, and knowledge advancement (e.g. see 
Council of the European Communities, 1986).  Additionally, however, the EC position also 
exhibits what Archer and Tritter (2000) call a ‘substantive’ approach to rationality, 
because moral issues associated with human advancement, both in terms of human and 
nonhuman animal harms, are signalled.  So, under the terms of the Directive, “An 
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experiment shall not be performed if another scientifically satisfactory method of 
obtaining the result sought, not entailing the use of an animal, is reasonably and 
practicably available” (Council of the European Communities, 1986, Article 7 (2)). This 
problematizes orthodox cost-benefit analyses, because the standard of avoiding 
nonhuman animals experiments where practicable, reveals a moral condition, associated 
with nonhuman animal costs, on the attainment of human advancement.    
 
As we have seen, Bauman (2000) observes the immorality of our present age in the 
narrow self-interested way in which we conduct our lives.  In this, Bauman uses the 
metaphor of a “garden culture” where, for the gardener, “all actions are instrumental, 
while all the objects of action are either facilities or hindrances” (1989, p. 92).  Fine and 
Hirsh, however, criticise Bauman for “obscur[ing] the inner connections between 
modernity and the development of moral consciousness itself” (2000, p. 184) and for us, 
thinking about experiments on nonhuman animals, this is perhaps confirmed by the long 
history of moral reasoning that centres on the position of nonhuman animals (e.g. see 
Tester, 1992). Indeed, regarding nonhuman animal experiments, Kean (1998) comments 
that moral concerns about them have led to their practice becoming increasingly 
controversial as modernity has progressed.  This increasing moral concern is prominent in 
the Assessment, which seeks to update the Directive because of ‘public/societal 
problems’ associated with ‘changed ethical and societal values’ (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008a, p.4).  Hence, contra Bauman, it seems that the moral 
issues associated with nonhuman animal harms trouble humans. This suggests that a 
multidimensional approach to choice, which complicates human self-interest by 
incorporating issues associated with moral reasoning, might be an appropriate tool for 
examining changes in the EC position on nonhuman animal experiments.  So, I now turn 
to Zafirovski’s (1999) multidimensional approach to rational choice, which, though having 
limitations (Peggs and Lampard, 1999)6, provides a more effective analytical tool for the 
exploration of multiple stimuli that go beyond the benefits (in this case repeatedly based 
in claims about the control and cure of diseases and other ills) often highlighted by 
promoters of nonhuman animal experiments. This approach enables a teasing out of the 
cultural, social psychological, political and economic influences associated with decisions 
about nonhuman animal experiments.  I start with cultural variables as this permits 
exploration of the moral dimension, increasingly prominent in the EC position.  
 
A multi-dimensional approach experiments on nonhuman animals 
 
Cultural variables 
 
Zafirovski’s (1999) cultural dimension (which embraces norms and values) most 
obviously incorporates the moral position extant in the EC texts.  This moral position 
lays emphasis on the conditional granting of licences, approved in the absence of 
alternatives, and granted on the basis that the alleviation of human suffering will 
outweigh the suffering of protected nonhuman animals used. Let us explore this 
further.  
 
The 2008 Assessment responds to the 1986 Directive statement that “All experiments 
shall be designed to avoid distress and unnecessary pain and suffering to experimental 
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animals” (Council of the European Communities, 1986, Article 7) by declaring that 
ethical considerations are “not sufficiently reflected” in the Directive (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2008a, p.3).  The Assessment finds limitations in two main 
areas of “animal welfare”: (a) the different standards of protection for nonhuman 
animals in different Member States7, marked by the differences in “the legal status of 
the system, the level at which ethical evaluation is implemented and the elements 
that are integrated in the evaluation process” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008a, p.16); and (b) the number of nonhuman animals used who are 
not covered by compulsory ethical evaluation, some 4.9 million in 2005  (Commission 
of the European Communities 2008a,  p.16).  It is thus clear that the moral focus is on 
the “Strengthening of the requirements for authorisation and ethical evaluation of 
projects” (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, p.5), rather than on 
whether nonhuman animal experiments should take place at all.  This position is 
confirmed by the assertion in the Proposal that “the use of live animals continues to 
be necessary to protect human and animal health and the environment” (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2008b, p.14).  
 
The main aim of ethical evaluation, according to the Assessment, “is to ensure that 
the use of animals is ethically justified” (Commission of the European Communities, 
2008a, p.17).  Ethical justification typically conforms to what Garner calls the “moral 
orthodoxy” where humans are “justified in choosing to sacrifice the interests of 
animals” in the event of a conflict of interests with humans if, without the pain or 
death of nonhuman animals, more suffering would result (Garner, 2005, p. 23).  Thus 
the Proposal asserts that ‘The likely harm to the animals should be balanced against 
the expected benefits of the project” (Commission of the European Communities, 
2008b, p.18). Signalled by an orientation to the Three Rs principle (of replace, reduce 
and refine the use of nonhuman animals in experiments), the ambition is to widen the 
reach of ethical evaluation while aiming for a reduction in the number of nonhuman 
animals used and a reduction in the suffering caused. The Assessment notes disquiet 
that the Directive “does not explicitly refer to, nor ensure the full application of the 
Three Rs principle” (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, p.3) with only 
15 Member States undertaking ethical evaluation on this basis (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008a, p.16).  This moral concern appears to confirm the 
departure of purely self-interested humans who inhabited orthodox rational choice 
models, a departure evidenced by the “harm-benefit” analysis (which focuses on 
nonhuman animal costs) and the “severity classification system” of nonhuman  animal 
harms, used in 13 Member States (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, 
p.16)8.  By means of the addition of a moral concern about harm to protected 
nonhuman animals (and we must remember, we are only talking about those 
nonhuman animals defined as ‘protected’), the EC seems to be positioned beyond an 
analysis based in the costs to humans if experiments do not take place (cost-benefit 
analysis), to one that also embraces concerns about the costs to nonhuman animals if 
they do take place (harm-benefit analysis).  This is present in the Proposal statement 
that “From the ethical standpoint, there should be an upper limit of pain, suffering 
and distress, above which animals should never be subjected in scientific procedures” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008b, p.16).  The harm-benefit analysis 
indicates EC recognition that protected nonhuman animals do suffer, and suggests a 
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moral imperative to avoid that suffering (where it is deemed illegitimate) and to ease 
that that suffering (where it is deemed unavoidable).  Furthermore, the orientation to 
the aspirations of Three Rs principle implies that the experiments that do take place 
are essential, non-negotiable, and as misery-free as possible   Consequently, the harm-
benefit analysis and the related Three Rs principle sanction nonhuman animal 
experiments on the grounds of perceived acceptable costs and acceptable benefits, 
while conveying a moral position associated with human responsibility to protected 
nonhuman animals.   
 
Further analysis of the texts indicates that enhancements associated with ethical 
review reach beyond the welfare of nonhuman animals.  The Assessment posits that, 
“Ethical evaluation is frequently mentioned as one of the key instruments to improve 
the scientific outcome and the welfare of experimental animals” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008a, p. 17).  So, the apparently exclusive concern about 
harm to nonhuman animals who fall outside ethical review also incorporates a 
human-centred worry about the effects of nonhuman animal harms on scientific 
results.  This is not surprising. Norms and values associated with the intrinsic 
importance of (biomedical) scientific research are deeply entrenched in Western 
societies (Gray, 2003, Haraway, 1997) and mention of damaging effects to scientific 
results might be intended to persuade doubters about the efficacy of the proposed 
changes.  Never the less the ranking of the concern about scientific results above that 
of a moral concern about nonhuman animal harms (notice the positioning in the 
extract above) resonates with the human-centred focus evident in more orthodox 
instrumental rationality. This is amplified by the persistent reference to the “non-level 
playing field” of ethical evaluation, which, the Assessment laments, exposes “animal 
users in different States to an uneven competitive environment” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008a, p. 17).  The now demoted concern about nonhuman 
animal harms is underlined by the subordinate position it is given in the hierarchy of 
Policy Objectives set down in the Assessment.  Here “a significant improvement in 
animal welfare and protection over the life time experience of experimental animals” 
appears as a Secondary Objective, behind reducing “unfair competition” (the Overall 
Objective) and ensuring a “level playing field” (the Primary Objective) (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2008a, p.29).  Accordingly, it seems that the display of 
concern about nonhuman animal harms is important in presentations of the ethical 
justification for nonhuman animal experiments, but it is less important than the 
market distortions that different practices and evaluations generate.   
 
The moral position in the EC is rooted in the differences in moral worth attributed to 
humans and nonhuman animals.  This should come as no surprise; this hierarchy of 
moral worth is taken-for-granted in most human societies.  As a result, protected 
nonhuman animals are viewed as having some moral worth but only as “second-class 
members” of the “moral club” (Rowlands, 2002, p. 27).  This hierarchy of moral worth 
is fundamental to the disadvantaged status of nonhuman animals and is the context in 
which choices are made about legitimate and illegitimate nonhuman animal suffering.   
Thus, we can speak of a  “thin veneer of civility surrounding human-animal relations” 
(Wolch and Emel, 1998, p. xi) because, in their status as second-class, millions of 
protected nonhuman animal are used annually in experiments that have been 
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declared morally legitimate in the EC.  However, not all nonhuman animals are 
allocated the status of even ‘second-class’, consequently, a further important element 
is the exclusivity of the ‘protected’ list of nonhuman animals, and Zafirovski’s (1999) 
social psychological variables facilitate further investigation.   
 
Social psychological variables 
 
Zafirovski (1999) includes interpersonal interactions, ties and networks in his social 
psychological variables, and the emphasis on human ties and networks is clear in 
discourses that extol an overriding moral responsibility to humans. Of course, it is 
understandable that there is a human aspiration to reduce, and optimistically eliminate, 
the ills associated with human life.  For instance, Williams (2006) maintains that it is 
reasonable that humans will stress the interests of themselves over nonhuman animals 
because humans are more important to us.  This is fundamental to biomedical ethics 
because, as Welchman observes, in the biomedical community “it is widely held that 
partiality to human interests is not only defensible, but obligatory” (2003, p. 245).  So it 
seems unsurprising that approval for nonhuman animal experiments is established in 
identification with the group ‘human’.  Our collective identity as human is based in our 
notions of our essential distinctiveness from nonhuman animals (Author 2009a, 2009b), 
but the grounds for this are becoming increasingly uncertain.  For instance, genetics 
suggests that species are not natural types but are “convenient taxonomic schemes” 
because all animals share 90 plus per cent of their genes (Fuller, 2006, p. 29), moreover 
developments in ethology persistently undermine the human/animal dualism (Midgley, 
2002).   Nevertheless, the tacit assumption of an essential and, most importantly here, 
hierarchical distinction between human and nonhuman animals is unquestioned in EC 
texts. 
 
Discourses that justify experiments on nonhuman animals on the basis of assumed 
essential differences are more complex than the human/nonhuman animal dualism 
suggests because, although nonhuman animals are identified as ‘animal’ (Derrida, 
2004, p. 125), some identified ‘animals’ are considered less acceptable (or rarely 
unacceptable) for use in experiments than others.  The most acceptable nonhuman 
animals are the un-‘protected’.  The 1986 Directive did not cover “any invertebrate 
species or the life stages before birth or hatching” (Council of the European 
Communities, 1986, Article 2d).  The Assessment continued this line, though it 
acknowledges sentience in some invertebrates (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008a, p.13), however, the Proposal protects cyclostomes, cephalopods 
and decapod crustaceans (Commission of the European Communities, 2008b, Annex 
1), but not all invertebrates.  The Proposal title (2008b) refers to ‘…the protection of 
animals used for scientific purposes’, which implies that all ‘animals’ are included, 
however, most invertebrates, and no humans, are considered ‘animal’ in this respect.  
But, the connection between humans and invertebrates ends here. Various legislative 
instruments protect humans; excluded invertebrates are mainly excluded wholesale.  
This comes as no surprise; we render ourselves too high to be marked ‘animal’ 9, most 
invertebrates we render as too low.    This is no revelation; even those who assert that 
humans have a moral responsibility to nonhuman animals often neglect some, if not 
all, invertebrates.  For example, Garner casually declares “it is extremely doubtful if 
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insects can feel pain and therefore they cannot be harmed in ways that animals can” 
(2002, p. 21).  Sentience is, to be sure, a problematic gauge, not least because some 
humans are defined as insentient (Singer 2002, p. 220).  However, this 
notwithstanding, because some invertebrates are covered, the Proposal seems to 
signal progression on the Directive and the Assessment.  Nonetheless, this 
development is based in categorisations in which some invertebrates, are labelled 
‘animal’ (thus are protected as part of ‘moral club’) and other invertebrates, are not 
labelled  ‘animal’, (and thus are not protected as part of the ‘moral club’ because they 
are judged lower than ‘animals’).  
 
Among protected nonhuman animals, species judged closer to human are often 
considered less (or un) acceptable for use in experiments.  For example, nonhuman 
primates are discussed separately in the Assessment because they are regarded as 
“species with highly developed social skills and behavioural manners that are to some 
extent similar to those of human behaviour”  (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008a, p. 21); and in the Proposal we are advised that “due to their 
genetic proximity to human beings” their use in experiments is controversial 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008b, p.15).   Nevertheless, in 2002, 
9,000 nonhuman primates were used in experiments in the EC Member States 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, p.20), and in some cases, their use 
was obligatory because ‘some scientific procedures require the use of [nonhuman 
primates]’(Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, p.21)10. So, their 
similarity to us problematizes experiments upon them, but their proximity to us makes 
their use highly beneficial, and at times required.  Among nonhuman primates, great 
apes are categorized as closer still to human. The Assessment notes that, ‘Great Apes 
[are] our closest ancestors with highly developed capacities’ (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008a, p. 52), consequently, ‘Due to the similarities with 
human beings, the ethical justification of their use is a sensitive issue and a subject of 
serious debate’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, p. 21-22).  No 
great apes have been experimented upon in the EC since 1999 (Commission of the 
European Communities 2008a p.52).  Great apes are often viewed as “honorary 
humans” (Midgley 2004, p. 147) and so, like humans, they are sheltered from a moral 
reasoning that advances the interests of humans over them.  However, this could 
change.  In taking into account the opposition of some scientists (noted in the 
Assessment) to a total ban on the use of great apes in experiments (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2008a), the Proposal allows for the use of great apes in 
experiments in exceptional circumstances that relate to the “preservation of the 
species or in relation to an unexpected outbreak of a life-threatening or debilitating 
condition in human beings” (Commission of the European Communities, 2008b, 
Article 50).  As a result, the very closeness of (nonhuman) great apes to humans11 
makes their position precarious; because they are so closed to us, we have given them 
a like-human position in the moral club, but because they are so close to us, this 
exulted position can be withdrawn when we feel threatened (or when we feel they 
are threatened) by the exceptional.   
 
The Assessment does not set apart other protected nonhuman animals for special 
protection; however, the discourse implies reflection on the position of nonhuman 
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animals with whom humans feel especially allied. For example, there is explicit alarm 
that “endangered species” might be harmed by “low animal welfare” (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2008a, p.13) and the Proposal stresses that experiments 
on endangered species should be severely limited (European Communities, 2008b).  
Additional reflection is also taken on some mammals, but not all mammals. For 
example, the casual observation in the Assessment that most of the 12.2 million 
nonhuman animals used in experiments in 2005 in the EC were mice and rats 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, p.9) confirms how these 
nonhuman mammals are viewed as laboratory equipment (see Midgley, 2004, p. 149).  
Although the Assessment reports that  “bigger animals are also used in significant 
numbers (e.g. about 20,000 dogs and about 10,000 nonhuman primates)” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008, p.9), the discourse conveys 
assurance that experiments are mainly carried out on small, nonhuman mammals 
who are held to be relatively trivial. Even so, bigger mammals are used, many of them 
being nonhuman primates (as discussed above) and even more being dogs.  Human 
relationships with dogs (who are often viewed as companions) render experiments on 
them controversial in the EC (though less controversial than experiments on 
nonhuman primates who are deemed closer in essence, rather than in relationship, to 
humans).   The Proposal extends additional reflection to other companions, cats, and 
proposes that, where appropriate, dogs and cats who have been used in experiments 
should be ‘re-homed in families as there is high public concern as to the fate of those 
animals’ (European Communities, 2008b, p.16). Accordingly, the special relationship 
demonstrated in this hierarchy of human concern extends to nonhuman animals with 
whom we have daily relationships (e.g. companions), those we want to preserve (e.g. 
endangered species) and those with whom we have an ambiguous relationship (e.g. 
nonhuman primates). Consequently, choices made about restrictions on, and 
permissions for, experiments on nonhuman animals extend beyond simply who is 
most functional for the purpose (in terms of a one-dimensional cost-benefit analysis), 
to who is most acceptable. 
 
In summary, ties and networks are central to the EC position on nonhuman animal 
experimentation; hence, a simple one-dimensional cost-benefit analysis is an inadequate 
analytical tool for examining discourses associated with such experiments.  However, 
these ties and networks are ambiguous.  Some nonhuman animals (e.g. great apes) are 
regarded as so close to humans that experiments on them are considered taboo, 
however, their very closeness to humans makes the veto precarious, given the potential 
for future medical achievements. Some nonhuman animals, such as other nonhuman 
primates, are seen as less acceptable than other nonhuman animals for experiments as 
they are categorized as social beings, but their closeness to human results in them being 
judged as necessary (indeed compulsory) targets.  The relationship between other 
vertebrate nonhuman animals and humans (e.g. dogs and cats as companions) or other 
similarities to humans (e.g. mammals) further complicates the network. After this, a 
backbone is decisive.  Having a backbone entitles restricted inclusion in an expanded 
network; with a backbone one’s position in the network is determined by closeness to the 
benchmark human; most of those without a backbone are not even given the protection 
that allows them to be experimented upon under specified conditions.  It is human-
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nonhuman animal power relations, explored below, that underpin this complicated 
network of ties and moral value.   
 
Political variables 
 
Power and domination are fundamental in Zafirovski’s political variables (1999) and 
nonhuman animal experimentation is based in human power (e.g. see Adams 1995, 
Author 2009a, 2009b).  Human power is unmistakable because humans decide which 
nonhuman animals will be harmed, whether to limit that harm, and indeed whether any 
nonhuman animals should be harmed in experiments at all. Thus, the Assessment aims to 
“Improve animal welfare by ensuring a minimum scrutiny and standards of all animal 
keeping and use in experimental purposes…”(Commission of the European Communities, 
2008a, p. 29). In contrast, nonhuman animals plainly have no decision-making power in 
choices made about experiments upon them. How do humans justify the power taken?  
Explanation rests in the presumption that ‘human’ has a natural essence different from, 
and hierarchically superior to, that of nonhuman ‘animal’.    
 
Notions of the naturalness of the differences (and similarities) between ‘human’ and 
nonhuman ‘animal’ obscure the centrality of power in hierarchical ‘insider/outsider’ 
classifications (e.g. see discussion in Author, 2009a, 2009b).  Hence, what humans define 
as  ‘natural’ distinctions between nonhuman animals (them) and humans (us) are taken as 
affording us the ‘right’ to experiment upon them; it seems not to be a power issue at all.  
These ‘natural’ distinctions are based in a range of indicators that are implied and taken 
for granted in the Assessment and Proposal (phrases such as “highly developed social 
skills and behavioural manners”, “highly aware and social animals” are applied to 
nonhuman primates who are considered to be like us), and these human 
conceptualisations and relational categorisations serve to collectively group nonhuman 
animals as essentially inferior ‘other’ and humans as superior ‘us’ (Author 2009a, 2009b).  
Although, as we have seen, some nonhuman animals are judged less ‘other’ (e.g. 
nonhuman primates) than others (e.g. mice), still it is through the subordination of the 
collective nonhuman animal ‘other’ that we can see that the “constitution of identity is an 
act of power” (Laclau 1990, p. 33) and it is differences in power that enable humans to 
experiment on nonhuman animals at all.  Thus, Adams reflects, nonhuman animal 
experimentation is a “power issue” because “disenfranchised bodies” are used to increase 
scientific knowledge (1995, p. 138).  Such increases in knowledge, based in experiments 
on disenfranchised bodies, also provide vast economic benefits. 
 
Economic variables  
 
Zafirovski’s economic variables most obviously conform to one-dimensional rational 
choice models because the economic human is conceptualised as a self-interested “utility 
maximiser” (Abell, 1989 in Zafirovski, 1999, p. 48) who makes every effort to maximise 
benefits and minimise costs.  Economic motivators are also central to the multi-
dimensional approach.  Utility, profit and wealth undoubtedly influence choices made 
about nonhuman animal experiments because experimenting on nonhuman animals is 
big business (Rowlands, 2002)12.    However, the profits to be made in the EC are 
threatened by unfairness, according to the Assessment, because of the ‘non-level playing 
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field’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, p. 4). The central place of 
economic considerations is clear in the stated aim of the 1986 Directive: 
 
to ensure that where animals are used for experimental or other scientific 
purposes the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative provisions 
in the Member States for their protection are approximated so as to avoid 
affecting the establishment and functioning of the common market, in particular 
by distortions of competition or barriers to trade (Council of the European 
Communities, 1986, Article 1). 
 
The Assessment prioritises this sentiment in the pronouncement that the overall objective 
is to “Strengthen the Single Market and reduce unfair competition” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008a, p. 29), because the “unequal competitive environment” is 
“defeating the objective of the Directive to avoid fragmentation of the internal 
market’”(Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, p. 3).  The main concern is 
that countries with “high animal welfare standards” incur higher costs and consequent 
competitive disadvantage (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, p.11).  The 
Assessment aims to level the economic field by enforcing higher welfare standards as 
minimum. Although nonhuman animal welfare is prominent, in the Assessment this 
principle is positioned below the reduction of  “unfair competition”, which diminishes the 
importance of the nonhuman animal welfare goal.  Moreover, even though the Proposal 
focuses mainly on the welfare of protected nonhuman animals, in the accompanying 
“Explanatory Memorandum” reference to “strengthening the protection of animals” 
retains its subordinate position to the incentive of “ensuring a level playing field” 
(European Communities, 2008b, p.2).  Nevertheless, the Proposal recommends improved 
conditions for nonhuman animals as a way of solving the problems it identifies.  
 
The Assessment concludes that “some of the options that provide for the highest animal 
welfare benefits create also the highest costs” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008a, p.68) and consequently suggests a compromise of “favoured 
benefits” (i.e. those that will achieve ‘proportional’, ‘quantifiable’, nonhuman animal 
benefits), estimated at the €143.7 million per year (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008a, p.5).  Nonhuman animal welfare improvements linked to, for 
example, changes to cage size and minimum housing and care requirements, are likely to 
result in increased economic expenditure and thus it is anticipated that there will be some 
opposition.  Being mindful of this, the Primary Objective in the Assessment, which focuses 
on a ‘Strong convergence of standards that ensures a level playing field for industry, 
researchers and suppliers of experimental animals’ seeks to “reduce unfair competition” 
by “harmonising the minimum requirements…”(Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008a, p.29).  Thus it is anticipated that the level playing field will lead to 
positive economic effects for those associated with nonhuman animal experiments; 
including universities, contract research institutes, pharmaceutical companies, breeders 
and suppliers of nonhuman animals and experimental equipment, and researchers 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, 2008b).    So, if we think back to 
orthodox rational choice theory, experiments on nonhuman animals are not only based in 
a cost-benefit analysis grounded in human attempts to shield ourselves from ills, but, as 
Adams (1995) contends, they are also economic ends in themselves.     
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Choosing moral progress rather than moral orthodoxy 
 
Zafirovski’s (1999) multidimensional rational choice model reveals that the costs and 
benefits associated with nonhuman animal experiments in the EC are more complex than 
an orthodox rational choice model might suggest.  Although the multidimensional 
approach reveals that nonhuman animal experiments in the EC remain grounded in 
human gains (and interests extend well beyond those expounded by scientists who 
usually focus on the human health benefits), discourses associated with consideration of 
the welfare of nonhuman animals have become increasingly prominent. This seems to 
signify an EC position that queries Bauman’s orthodox rational choice “garden culture”, 
where experiments on nonhuman animals would be instrumentally focused on human 
benefit goals and costs, without concern about the moral issues associated with 
nonhuman animal costs connected with the means of achieving goals.  However, 
although moral considerations are incorporated in the EC Proposal, these concerns 
remain rooted in a moral orthodoxy where differences in moral worth are attributed to 
humans and nonhuman animals.   
 
The Impact Assessment and the Proposal are grounded in discourses that extol human 
ties with humans, and this promotes emphasis on the interests of humans above those of 
nonhuman animals.  The promotion of human interest is a fundamental biomedical ethic, 
and values associated with the intrinsic importance of biomedical research for curing 
human ills are deeply entrenched in Western societies. In consequence, a moral club has 
been generated (where moral commitment to the human is obligatory), in which humans 
are first-class members and nonhuman animals are, at best, second-class.  Moreover, 
second-class membership is reserved for chosen nonhuman animals, who are ‘protected’ 
by EC regulations, the un-‘protected’ (that is most species of invertebrates) are denied 
membership of the moral club.  Among the protected, some are judged closer to first-
class than others and, those judged closest to human, especially in essence, are most 
‘protected’ (though the closeness of nonhuman primates to humans makes them 
obligatory targets in some experiments).  Indeed, great apes are judged so close to human 
that they can only be used in experiments in exceptional circumstances. The moral club is 
thus more complex than second-class ‘them’ (‘animal’) and first-class ‘us’ (‘human’) 
membership implies, but this complexity does not erode the hierarchically superior status 
that humans have awarded the human; the human is still superlative.  The human status 
of first-class bestows many benefits and one of these is the power to make decisions 
about the fate of nonhuman animals in the EC. 
 
Presumed ‘natural’ hierarchical distinctions between nonhuman animals and humans are 
established as affording humans the ‘right’ to experiment upon nonhuman animals; the 
power issue is thus disguised. However, a power issue it is, because it is humans who 
make decisions about nonhuman animal experiments in the EC; nonhuman animals 
plainly have no decision-making power in choices made about experiments upon them. 
Yet, the moral orthodoxy requires that nonhuman animal experiments are justified 
‘morally’ only if they serve ‘necessary’ human interests; so the ‘right’ of humans to 
undertake experiments is tempered by an engagement with moral concerns about 
‘protected’ nonhuman animals.  None the less, this moral concern is strongly associated 
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with economic gains. Most fundamental to the proposed EC changes is the smoothing of 
the “non-level playing field” and the reduction of “unfair competition” that results from, 
the Assessment laments, varying ethical review standards in different Member States.  So, 
nonhuman animal experiments are not only based in a cost-benefit analysis grounded in 
human attempts to shield ourselves from ills, a harms-benefits analysis that examines the 
harms to nonhuman animals used in experiments, a power relationship that gives the 
human the power to make the choice, they are primary economic ends in themselves.  
 
The main aim in this paper was to examine the moral reasoning associated with the 
approval of experiments on nonhuman animals in the EC to examine contentions of 
moral progress. It seems that our values prevent us from making decisions about 
nonhuman animal experiments for purely stark human self-interest.  So, the EC position 
rejects cost-benefits for humans alone, and the Proposal strengthens this rejection, which 
was also apparent in the 1986 Directive. Never the less, the EC continues to operate 
within the moral orthodoxy, where ‘human’ is the point of reference and permissible 
harms and costs are ultimately associated with the well being of the human.  Thus, the 
discourses within the EC texts normalise the ‘social construction of speciesist reality’ 
(Nibert, 2002, p.195) and layers of ethical approval and moral progress mask the 
normalised oppression of nonhuman animals.  So, the human still plays gardener in 
Bauman’s garden, with a very narrow moral scope.  A wider moral scope extends beyond 
reiterating human self-importance to seeing nonhuman animals as well as humans as 
valuable creatures in themselves.  In the words of Bauman, we could expand our moral 
scope by letting in ‘the Other as a neighbour…back from the wasteland of calculated 
interests to which it had been exiled…[via] an ethics that recasts the Other as the crucial 
character in the process through which the moral self comes into its own’ (1993: 84).    
Such an approach in the EC would demonstrate moral progress indeed.   
 
Notes
                                                 
1 My thanks to Keith Tester, and to two anonymous referees for their comments on a 
previous draft of this paper.   
2 The Coalition For Medical Research (2007) argues that nonhuman animals also 
benefit from such experiments. 
3  For one Member State the figures are for 2004 (Commission of the European 
Communities 2007). 
4 Beckford’s (1999) ‘degree of complexity’ and ‘level of agency’ provide bases for 
considering the problem that Craven (1992), among others, points up.    
5 For example, Greek and Greek, hold that “the extrapolation of results from animal 
models misleads scientists and harms human patients” (2002, p.11). 
6 Peggs and Lampard note that Zafirovski seems to acknowledge that his model 
underestimates ‘the extent to which the various factors are part of a complex whole…’ 
(1999: 109) 
7 Seventeen of the 25 member States have some form of ethical evaluation 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008, p.16).   
8 The Assessment indicates that 13 Member States use a ‘harm-benefit analysis’ for 
ethical analysis and 13 Member States employ ‘a severity classification system’ 
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(Commission of the European Communities p.16).  It is not clear whether the 13 
Member States referred to are the same in each case. 
9 Indeed, the most serious charge that can be laid against humans is that they behaved 
like ‘animals’ (Midgley, 2004).   
10 Vaccine research for Hepatitis C, and polio, HIV research and ‘investigations into 
higher cognitive functions’ require the use of nonhuman primates (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008a, p.21). 
11 Humans, chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans have been categorized as great 
apes in for example, animal rights campaigns such as the Great Ape Project (e.g. see 
Singer 2002). 
12 For example, the total annualised sales of Charles River Laboratories (a supplier of 
nonhuman animals for experiments) were reported to exceed $1.2 billion in 2007 
(Online Investor, 2008, p. 1) 
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